Editorial, Christian Science Monitor
ince World War II, the production of services as a share of U.S. real gross national product (GNP( has risen from 58 percent to 68 percent. The concomitant shift in the distribution of the labor force has been much larger: about half of U.S. workers were employed in service industries in 1948; this proportion had increased to nearly three-fourths by 1985. These momentous changes have given rise to fears that the United States is fast becoming a nation of people who are "serving each other hamburgers or taking in each other's laundry."
The irony in this view is that it embodies a profound misinterpretation of U.S. economic history, both recent and long-term. It has been the strength, rather than the weakness, of the manufacturing sector that has precipitated the shifts in employment and output toward services. Put simply, high productivity growth in manufacturing and agriculture and the long-term
Mack Ott is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis. James C. Poletti provided research assistance. 'See Christian Science Monitor (1987) . 'Murray (1987) . Of course, many economists and commentators have countered this simplistic characterization of rising service employment and output; for example, see Browne (1986) , Krugman and Hatsopoulos (1987) , Mcusic (1987) , Shelp and Hart (1986) , Tatom (1986 Tatom ( , 1987 and Seaberry (1987) . The phrase has become so idiomatic that Browne used it as the title of an article debunking its thrust. She points out that the share of employment in the narrow service sector ("other services" in this article) has been rising faster than manufacturing for some time.
effects of American investment in education have
made the faster growth of the service sector possible.
These forces have persisted not just since World War II, but for a century or more. Similat-trends in output and labor characterize the last century of economic history in othet-industrial nations as well.
The purpose of this article is to document these long-mn trends and to highlight some of the forces driving them. The conclusion from this overview is that, far from indicating a decline in the U.S. economic outlook, the rising share of services reflects the increasing productivity and well-being of workers, both inside and outside of U.S. factories and mills.
OUTPUT, LABOR AND CAPITAL EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1948: A BRIEF REVIEW
During the postwar era, output of the U.S. economy as measured by real GNP has more than tripled, from $1.1 trillion (in 1982 dollars) in 1948 to $3.7 trillion in 1986. Meanwhile, civilian employment nearly doubled, from 58.3 million to 109.6 million. Since the economy has been growing, analysis is greatly facilitated by considering proportional shares rather than levels of output and labor. Chart I shows that, while the services share of output has risen and, consequently, the commodities share has fallen, the share of real GNP in manufacturing output has remained virtu-
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Chart 1
Distribution of Real GNP 1948 -1985 ally unchanged at roughly 21 percent.
3 Consequently, the widespread perception of U.S. deindustrialization is puzzling.
In 1948, 31.4 million Americans were gainfully employed in seMce industries and 26.9 million in commodities production. Service sector employment since then has grown apace with total employment, rising to 83.2 million in 1985. Concurrently, employ-'The commodities sector includes agriculture, manufacturing, mining and construction industries; agriculture, in turn, includes forestry and fishing. The services sector includes transportation, communications, utilities, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, and other services industries; finance includes banking, thrift, finance and real estate, and other services includes personal services, business services, auto repair, health services, legal services and miscellaneous professional services. To mitigate the unavoidable confusion between the services sector and its other services subsector, the subsector will be referred to as other services unless the context makes this unnecessary. ment in the commodity sector has grown much more slowly. In particular, agricultural employment declined by over half, from 6.6 million workers to 3.0 million, mining fluctuated around 1.1 million, constmction varied between 3 million and 5 million, and manufacturing grew from 16 million to a peak of 20.9 million in 1979, then declined to around 19.2 million in 1985.
As a result of its faster growth, the share of employment in the services sector has risen during the four postwar decades, from about 54 percent in 1948 to 72 percent in 1985. As table I shows, the postwar rise in the share of labor IL) in services and its fall in commodities has been persistent and general across subsectors. Among the service subsectors, other services rose from a 13.2 to a 23.2 percent employment share; government employment rose from 11.7 to 18.3 percent, then talled off to 16.3 percent; and finance nearly doubled, from 3.2 to 6.2 percent. Only transportation declined appreciably as railroads lost their dominance in freight and passenger markets to trucking and airline firms.
In commodities production, the share of labor in agriculture fell from 11.4 percent in 1948 to 2.9 percent in 1985, and mining's share halved, from 1.8 to 0.9 percent. Manufacturing employment, rising in absolute terms until 1979, fell persistently throughout the period in shate terms, from 27.4 to 18.7 percent. Only construction had the same employment share, 5.7 percent in 1985 as in 1948. Table 1 also delineates the shifting capital (K) and output IV) shares in the postwar U.S. economy. As was shown in chart 1, the commodities output share declined from 41.2 percent to 32.4 percent, but the decline was virtually all in agriculture, mining and construction. in services, the distribution of rising output shares during 1948-85 was quite diverse: Communications and utilities shares doubled and tripled, respectively, and financial services had the largest share increase -5 percentage points -while government services and transportation had declining shares.
The decline in the transportation output share from 1948 (6.8 percent) to 1985 (3.5 percent) made the shift in the capital from commodities to services smaller than it otherwise would have been. As the railroad's share of transportation output fell from 1948 to 1985, there was a substitution of public for private capital in the transportation sector. The privately owned railroad capital stock -equipment and rights-of-waywas supplanted not only by privately owned trucks and aircraft but also by the publicly owned highways, airports and air control netwoi-ks used by trucking companies and airlines.' If transportation capital were excluded from table 1, the change in the distribution of the capital stock from 1948 to 1985 would reveal a much greater rise in the service sector's capital share: from 44.5 percent in 1948 to 70.1 percent in 1985.
In sum, the postwar shift of the U.S. economy toward services has been pervasive: all sectors of ser-'The rising share of capital in the truck and air carrier sectors has not been commensurate with their rising proportion of transport services. In 1948, the railroads accounted for about one-fifth of the entire U.S. capital stock, but by 1985, this share had shrunk to less than one-thirtieth. In terms of the transportation sector's capital stock, the railroad share fell from 78 percent in 1948 to 37 percent in 1985. Over this same period, the share of transportation output in GNP (1982 $) from railroads fell from 38 percent to just over 17 percent, while the share of truck and air carriers rose from 14.5 to 60 percent. Yet, the share ot transportation capital in the truck and air carrier industries rose from about 7 to 36 percent, a much smaller increase than the decrease in the railroad capital stock, vices other than transportation and government have become proportionally larger and more capitalintensive. Thus, while it may be provocative to speak of the rising share of services as being produced by short-order cooks and laundry workers, it is grossly inaccurate (see opposite page): As illustrated in the postwar breakdown of the other services subsector, the service activities which have grown fastest since 1948 have been those in which capital investmentboth in human skills and in physical equipmenthave been substantial. More important, the shift toward services, did not commence in the 1970s, but characterizes the entire postwar era, and reflects a substantive shift in the occupational characteristics of the U.S. labor force as well.
WHY HAS THE SERVICE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT SHARE RISEN SINCE 1948?
There are two fundamentally interrelated reasons for the rise in the service sector's share of employment in the postwar era: slower growth in labor productivity and faster growth in the demand for services.'
Slower Productivity Growth in Services
Labor productivity is measured by the ratio of output per hour of labor input (V/Il). As table 2 shows, overall labor productivity in the U.S. economy rose at an average rate of 1.8 percent peryear, from $11.23 per hour (in 1982 dollars) in 1948 to $21.66 per hour in 1985.6 Productivity growth was much slower in the 'The relatively rapid productivity growth in manufacturing has been widely documented as an explanation for the declining labor input; see for example, Tatom (1986 Tatom ( ,1987 , McUsic (1986) and Krugman and Hatsopoulos (1986) . The OECD's ongoing estimation of Purchasing Power Parity also provides support for optimists about the /eve/ of U.S. productivity. Real GDP per capita for the United States in 1986 is 41 percent greater than for Japan and 33 percent larger than for Germany. These ratios are essentially unchanged from 1985; see 615 (1987) .
'When productivity is measured on a per worker basis, the results are even more divergent than the per hour basis shown in table 2 -1 .85 percent annual growth rate overall with 2.32 percent in commodities vs. 1.47 percent in noncommodities; however, the per worker data include self-employed, while the hourly data in table 2 do not. By reporting on a per hour basis, the distortion due to the divergent patterns of hours per week in different sectors are avoided, but at the cost of omitting data on entrepreneurs, proprietors and especially farmers who are the most important class of owner-operators (Indeed, the agriculture sector data underlying table 2 imply half-time employment throughout the 1948-85 period -929 annual hours in 1948 and 1,068 in 1985.) . When agriculture's productivity is measured per worker (including the self-employed owners), its growth rate during 1~48-85is 3.33 percent compared to the table 2 figure of 2.95 percent.
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service sector (1.6 percent per year) than in the commodity sector (2.0 percent per year).
The slower productivity growth in services was not at all uniform across its subsectors. Labor productivity growth in communications (COM) was the fastest of all subsectors, and it was nearly as fast in utilities (UTIL). At the same time, wholesale trade (WHO) labor productivity grew faster than the average rate of the commodity industries. Yet, as noted earlier, the employment shares in these service categories did not rise appreciably during the postwar era. The subsectors that accounted for virtually the entire increase in the service employment shares -other services, retail trade and finance -had average annual productivity growth rates of only about 1 percent.
Perhaps some of this slower productivity growth resulted from the shorter average work year in services (measured in hours), implying a large component of part-time employment. In 1985, the average hours per employee in commodities, 1,783 hours, was nearly three weeks longer than the average in noncommodities, 1,672 hours; moreover, in the service sector annual hours varied considerably. For example, communications and utilities workers averaged 1,986 and 1,936 hours in 1985, roughly the same as the average in manufacturing, 1,942 hours; in contrast the other services, finance and retail sectors each had average employee hours of less than 1,670 hours. Conversely, construction (1,575 hours) and agriculture (1,068 hours) also had low annual hours. Both industries are seasonal and susceptible to the vagaries of weather, but construction has had negative productivity growth while agriculture's productivity growth has been very high. Thus, low hours in and of themself do not provide an explanation for slow productivity growth.
Bising labor productivity results from either an increase in the proficiency of workers-an increase in human capital -or an increase in plant and equipment -nonhuman capital.~Focusing for the moment 'Theodore W. Shultz is the economist most influential in developing the notion of "human capital" for the reservoir of skills, proficiencies and knowleoge, for which he was awarded the 1979 Nobel Prize in Economics; see Shultz (1961) . The rise in this productive capacity of workers comes from two sources. Experience, som~times referred to as the learning curve, enhances the rapidity and accuracy of workers in completing assigned tasks. Formal training, both classroom and on-the-job, increases the understanding and insight of workers, which leads to rising facility and quality through better methods and product innovation. on nonhuman capital, table 2 shows that during 1948.-85, capital-labor ratios (K/H) have at least doubled in every sector of the U.S. economy except construction and transportation, and that productivity (V/H) generally has grown faster in those sectors with faster capital growth (K/H).' As with productivity, however, these ratios have risen more slowly in services (1.7 percent per year) than in commodities (2.8 percent per year).'
While productivity growth has been slower overall in services, it has resulted from neither a dearth of investment nor intrinsically lower capital intensity of services; indeed, as noted earlier, if one omits transportation, capital grew much more rapidly in services than in commodities production. As shown in table 2, capital-labor ratios have been consistently higher in four of the seven service sectors than in manufacturing, and the capital-labor ratios in the communications and wholesale categories were the fastest growing of all sectors. Moreover, in every industrial sector, capital has grown more rapidly than labor since 1948.1Ĩ n particular, the capital-labor ratio in other services grew faster than that in manufacturing -3.0 percent vs. 2.8 percent -even though the other services share of labor was rising while the manufacturing share of 'The rank-order correlation between the 1948-85 sectoral growth rates of Y/H and KJH in table 2 is .46; if transportation is omitted (given the distortion in the capital-labor-output relations entailed in the shift from railway to airline and trucking), the rank order correlation is .53. Both correlation statistics are significant at the 5 percent level. 'Evaluating the impact of the increased capital input fully would require a consideration of the quality of capital and technological change. Also, the real price of a machine with given capacity may have declined during the 1948-85 period; if so, the quantity of capital would be understated. More important, technological advances occurred during this period, especially in computercontrolled manufacturing processes. For example, numerical control and multi-axis omnimills have made possible the manufacture of aircraft and rocket engines to tolerances not feasible at the beginning of the period. These applications also have reduced the labor input required in design and engineering processes through the automation of drafting and modeling procedures. Proliferation of these changes can be sampled by a glance at want-ads for CAD/ CAM workers -computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing. Moreover, the growth of capital-labor ratios is driven both by capital growth and labor growth. As table 1 shows, the share of both capital and labor have risen in services, while labor has fallen and capital has risen in commodities, especially agriculture. Thus, labor shifts may amplify or attenuate the accompanying capital increases in terms of the capital-labor ratios.
"Since the employment share fell in manufacturing, it is possible that the increases in capital-labor ratios, were due to falling employment rather than rising capital. Yet, as table 1 shows, the share of private. net U.S. nonresidential capital in manufacturing, like its share of output, has remained relatively constant at about 22 percent during the postwar period. Thus, capital invested in manufacturing industries has grown apace with its output.
There is substantive evidence that the postwar rise in the share of U.S. output in services reflects a relative shift in final demand for services and away from commodities. Output of services has risen as a share of total output (table 1); a rise in the relative price of services, then, can only mean that the demand for them also has increased relative to commodities. As shown in table 3, the relative price of consumption services measured in terms of the price of durable goods has more than doubled since 1948.12 More generally, the lower half of the table indicates that the relative price of all services (producers' as well as Why has the demand for services risen as a share of output even though their prices relative to commodities have risen? One plausible answer is that the quality of services has risen, and the data, unadjusted for the quality improvement, understate quantity and, therefore, overstate price. 13
Another answer that has been advanced by development economists and economic historians is that, as economies mature) rising income is progressively directed toward put-chases of "higher-order" or luxury goods of which services predominate. Thus, Clark (1951) found that:
'~Serviceoutput is primarily measured in terms of inputs; thus, if inputs, especially labor, increase in their productivity -e.g., physicians or accountants and lawyers assisted by computer -their hourly charges will rise and, uncorrected for the quality rise, the unit price will incorrectly be raised by the same amount. Such errors would also lead to understated productivity growth in table 2. Manmont (1969) , who provides a detailed description of the methods and shortcomings of the U.S. Commerce Department's accounting procedures for services, eloquently encapsules this measurement problem (p.16):
The industries that are the sub)ect of this paper do not make a pair of shoes, a refrigerator, or a drill press; all of which are tangible and can be counted, although with varying degrees of ambiguity. Instead, they provide services, that is, they safeguard savings, insure lives, lend money, advertise businesses, audit books, restore health, repair cars, and so on. Conceptual questions that are extremely difficult to answer are raised when one attempts to count such units of output or measure changes in their quality in order to provide a meaningful and consistent measure of their contribution to total GNP. labor was falling. In summary, capital investment was rapid in each service sector except transportation."
Faster Demand Growth in Services
consumners') measured in terms of the price of goods has risen by about two-thirds since 1960.
in the most advanced countries the demand for manufactured goods tends to settle down finally at about 20-25 percent of the national income. The demand for farm products falls to 10 percent of national income, and will fall lower as income advances further. rt follows that in the most advanced countries the demand for services, including building and handicrafts and the products of small-scale manufacture, will rise to 70 percent or more of national income."
LONG-RUN TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF OUTPUT AND INPUT SHA14ES
The discussion of the U.S. postwar economy, the data in tables 1-3, and the shaded insert on page 9
clearly establish five characteristics about the evolution of output and input shares:
• The share of U.S. output in services has risen steadily over the entire 1948-85 period; • Labor productivity has grown faster in the commodities sector than in the services sector;
• The shift in output has reflected a relative shift in consumer demand toward services; • Labor and capital inputs have persistently risen in services production; • 'the shift of labor into the services subsector of "othei services" production has been primarily into activities requiring specialized skills, not into unskilled activities.
These observations raise questions about the long-run character of U.S. economic development:
• How long has the relative rise in service production and employment been going on? • What has happened to the distribution of U.S. labor by occupation over longer time periods? • Are [he other maior industrial economies experiencing similar' or parallel employment and output evolutionaiy patterns?
Output and Labor Shares in the U.S.
Economy, 1800-1985
The main currents driving the evolution of U.S. output and labor distribution since 1800 have been the More consistent data ar'e available on the distribution of output and labor for the period from 1870 to 1940. Unfortunately, the output data are for national income in current prices, which distort the distribution of shares among sectors." Nonetheless, with these caveats, the data on national income and employment shares by industry for' 1870-1940 are presented in table 4.
The most obvious char'acteristic of the data in table 4 is the steady rise in the proportion of the labor force in service production over the 70-year period, along with the concomitant decline in the proportion of labor in commodity production. The proportion of the labor foice in agriculture fell from one-half in 1870 to about one-sixth in 1940. Although the manufacturing share rose over this period, most of the labor' released from agriculture went to services production, whose share roughly doubled. While the distribution of employment gains varies across the various service categories, every category's share rises strongly.
" Lebergott (1964) "Gross National Product (GNP) less capital consumption allowance (estimated depreciation) equals Net National Product (NNP). NNP less indirect businesstaxes plus subsidies less current surplus from government enterprises equals National Income (NI). NI is convenient for some analyses because it is equal to the sum of all payments to factors of production -wages and salaries plus profits plus rent plus interest, Two distortions are introduced by taking shares of NI in current dollars rather than GNP in constant dollars: First, if productivity in agriculture and manufacturing grew faster than in other sectors, the resulting decline in unit prices over the 70 years in these sectors will overstate their share in real terms in early years and understate it in later years. Also, since national income omitsdepreciation, indirect taxes and subsloles, the data also may distort the shares relative to total value added on a real GNP basis. For an illustration of how changes in the relative price of manufacturing affects shares of real GNP, see table 3 in Perna (1986), p. 32.
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Chart 2
Share of Employment in U.S. Service Sector 1870-W85
Overall, the shift of employment from commodity to services production has been both persistent and relatively steady. An examination of the data from 1880 to 1930 reveals that the share of employment in services grew at an average annual rate of about 1.8 percent."
Applying this 1880-1930 trend growth rate to the 1880 labor share and projecting it over the succeeding 105 years, as cihart 2 does, fits the rising labor share reasonably well. The predicted 1985 services labor force "By definition, the employment share in services must lie between 0 and 100 percent; consequently, a simple trend exponential growth rate is not relevant in forecasting the share. A logistic growth curve, well as industrial craftsmen, operatives arid laborincluding lawyers, nurses, accountants, gardeners, and even cooks and laundry workers. Consequently, any change in the amount of support work accomplished outside of the corporation by subcontracting for services will change the distribution of employment even if the set of tasks being accomplished overall is unchanged."
On the othet-hand, the set of tasks to be accomplished in any production activity has evolved during this century due to innovation and capital investment, particularly investment in human capital." For example, in the production of machine tools since 1900, the relative laborinputs ofengineers, designers, computer operators and the like have risen relative to machinists, other craftsmen and operatives. Thus, a more complete picture of the distribution of the U.S. labor force can be obtained by considering its occupational as well as its industrial distribution. The occupational breakdown of U.S. employment based on the U.S. de- cennial censuses for 1900-80 is given in table 5.
Several features of the occupational distribution's evolution are clarified by the data in table 5 which shows U.S. census percentage distribution of workers by standard occupational categories." First, as indicated earlier, the share of employees in agricultural occupations has declined precipitously -from 37.6 percent in 1900 to 2.8 percent in 1980 (the sum of farmers and farm labor entries in table 5). More striking, however, is the rise in the share of technical and managerial occupations and the decline of unskilled "That subcontracting of services is a key impetus in the rise of service employment was emphasized by several experts testifying in the congressional hearings on service industries. See U.S. Congress (1984) . For example, Kravis argued: The other factor pushing up employment in the service industries is the tendency of commodity-producing industries to contract out services formerly performed in-house. . . . The advantages of employing outside specialists increase as technology becomes more complicated -for example, computerized accounting and -more capital intensivecleaning office buildings, catering employee meals: the hiring of in-house [sicl lawyers to handle labor negotiations and tax matters.(p. 426) "This implies the increasing importance of human capital in production, which, in turn, has been facilitated by a rise in the schooling of the average American worker. In 1900, the average American worker had completed 7.7 years of schooling; in 1957, schooling per worker was 11.0 years and in 1984, it was 12.1 years. Moreover, the school year, measured in average attendance pen pupil, has increased by over 60 percent, from 99 days in 1900 to 159 days in 1957 to 162 days in 1970. See Shut (1971) and U.S. Department of Commerce (1986), table No. 671, p.397. "One tacit measure of rising U.S. welfare is the increase in the age at which labor force entry is presumed to take place, from 10 years of age in the 19th century to 14 years in the mid-2Oth century to 16 years in the late 20th century. In part, this reflects the increasing investment in human capital through formal schooling.
or unspecialized labor. In 1900, private household workers plus farm plus nonfarm labor accounted for 35.6 percent of employment, while technical and managerial occupations absorbed about 10.1 percent; in 1980, these low-skill labor categot-ies constituted only 6.6 percent of the labor force, while management and technical occupations had increased to a 27.3 percent share." Although skilled manual trades -craftsmen, foremen and operatives -made up a larger share of the labor force in 1980 than they did in 1900, this share had declined markedly from its peak in 1950 -from 34.4 percent to 26.7 percent. Most of this decline was in operatives, especially from 1970 to 1980; some may reflect the upgrading in job skill requirements to professional and technical, a category whose increase occurred primarily during these three decades.
A more informative taxonomy is to divide the occupational types into the following three categories: information provision and decisionmaldng, direct production, and non-information services. These groupings, the subheadings in table 5, divide the census categories according to the primary form of output generated by the worker. The first category encompasses the production of information by decisionmakers and all the supporting design, analysis and record-keeping occupations and sales staff. The second comprises labor directly involved in production of goods and public utility services such as transport and electricity. The third consists of services other than information or utilities: private household services, police and fix-c services, and food and cleaning services. The evolution of labor shares within these more inclusive categories is rendered in chart 3 for the years 1900, 1950 and 1980." The data from table 5, summarized in chart 3, show that during this century the information and decisionmaking occupations have grown from about one-sixth of all employment to well over half. Direct production "Considering only nonagricultural employment (that is excluding both farm management and farm labor), the share of unskilled labor fell from 28.7 percent of U.S. nonfarm employment in 1900 to 5.2 percent in 1980. During these eight decades, management, technical and other information occupations rose from 28.2 percent to 54.5 percent of persons employed in nonfarm occupations. "The information category of employment was emphasized by several witnesses in the Congressional hearings on Service Industries [U.S. Congress (1984) ], especially Levinson and Roach, pp. 261-87. This taxonomy does not quite conform to the commodities/ services division used earlier since technical occupations include both medical diagnosis and treatment, while operatives include transportation and some other services such as occupations in public utilities. labor, meanwhile, has fallen from about three-fourths of employment to about one-third. The principal source of the decline in production occupations has been agriculture, whose share fell from 37.5 percent in 1900 to less than 3 percent in 1980. Nonagricultural production occupations have a slightly lower share in 1980 than in 1900, but are well down from their maximum share of 41.1 percent attained in 1950. The noninformation services share has increased slightly; in fact, since 1940, its share has risen by 1.2 percentage points with the decline in household services being slightly more than offset by the rise in other services primarily protection -fire, police and security).
The data from table 5 also can be used to illustrate the relatively steady evolution of the U.S. occupational distribution in this century. A growth curve is fit to the labor share in information provision/decisionmaking occupations as it evolved during 1900-30. Projecting the share of employment in this category can then be used to determine if there have been abrupt shifts during the 1930-80 period." As chart 4 shows, the projected share based on 1900-30 data fits the occupational distribution quite well, growing at an annual rate of about 2.2 percent: the predicted 1980 share is 55.9 percent 1 compared with its actual share of 53.0 percent (table 5) . A similar exercise for the direct "Since the employment share in information provision! decisionmaking must lie between 0 and 100 percent, a logistics curve is appropriate to assess the trend; see footnote 19. The fitted logistics curve using the 1900 and 1930 shares (5,) from tableS is 5, = [1 + exp(1.544-0.022 (t-1900) ) 1'. Table 5 and charts 3 and 4 show that the lünctional role of the typical American employee is progressively moving away from the final mechanical step of commodities production -that is, fabrication assembly, orpackaging." More than 50 percent ofemployment is now concentrated in analysis, design, managing and recording processes, and sales, while, by inference, U.S. capital (or foreign labor) is occupied to a larger extent in mechanical production. Some observers decry this as the initial symptom of industrial calamity:
The result is the evolution of a new kind of company: manufacturers that do little or no manufacturing and are increasingly becoming service-oriented, They may perform a host of profit-making functions -from design to distribution -but lack their own production base. In contrast to traditional manufacturers, they are hollow corporations."
"This notion -that innovation and investment make the production process more roundabout or lengthen the period of production-is the focus of a long-standing debate in economic theory. It is at the core of the Austrian approach to capital theory; see 'The Austrian Theory of Capital and Interest,' chapter 12 in Blaug (1985) .
"Business Week (1986), p. 57. Ironically, the same article positively Yet this evolution simply reflects the operation of the law of comparative advantage. As U.S. labor has become more productive -due to increased human and nonhuman capital -the opportunity cost of its use in lower-valued stages of production has risen.
Those production processes in which capital cannot sufficiently substitute for (or augment) labor must be ceded to foreign lower-cost labor." This view of labor complements the conclusion of an analysis of the performance and competitiveness of U.S. multinational corporations by Lipsey and Kravis: assesses several companies whose primary activities are product research and development distribution with production done in foreign countries due to high domestic labor costs: Nike Shoe (German), Emerson Radio Corp. (U.S.), Pitney Bowes Inc. (U.S.) and IBM (U.S.). "The process works in reverse as well. Feder (1987) Kotlowitz (1987) . This announcement followed by less than threemonths the Nippon Steel decision to close 12 of its steel mills in Japan; see Cullison (1987) . The Lipsey-Kravis hypothesis is consistent with the persistent downward trend of the postwar share of manufacturing employment. Yet, since the share of. U.S. output in manufacturing has been constant over this period, this trend does not imply the demise of the manufacturing sector. Moreover, if the other industrial economies have experienced similar trends in employment and output shares, these trends can be interpreted as a normal stage of advanced industrialization. For example,  as table 6 shows, the Japanese share of output in agriculture was more than 54 percent in 1890 and the corresponding employment share was 76 percent. These shares were somewhat smaller for France and the United States, and considerably smallei-for Germany and Great Britain. Over the succeeding 60 years, in these countries agricultural activity declined, while their goods production sectors' share rose.
International Comparisons of Output and Labor Distribution
From 1950 to 1984, while the specific patterns of the production and output evolution vary somewhat, the five industrial economies share three key features. First, the proportion of goods production to real gross domestic product (GDP) peaked between 1960 and 1970, and has fallen to less than 40 percent for each, with the decline smallest for Japan." Second, the share of employment in goods production, which also peaked between 1960 and 1970, has declined for each country from 1970 from through 1984 from ." Third, by 1984 nation had similar output and employment shares in services production." Some semblance of these long-term output and labor shifts can be seen in the three developing economies included in table 6: Greece, Spain and Turkey.
Over the 1960-84 span, employment and output shares declined most in agriculture; while these proportions rose for both goods and service production, the largest increases were in the service sectors. This pattern resembles the shifts during 1870 -1940 in the U.S. economy see table 4).
"GDP is GNP less net factor income from abroad.
"Once again, the Japanese decline is slight, but Japan began the 1 960s with by far the largest reservoir of agricultural employment, a reservoir that over the next 24 years declined by 21.3 percentage points. This employment outf low contributed a large low-cost inflow into manufacturing which the other industrial economies had long since absorbed. This pattern is similar to the decline in U.S. agricultural employment during 1870-1940; see discussion above, p. 12 and table 4. "This similarity probably will become even closer as Japan reduces its inefficient share of agricultural labor. Declining Japanese agricultural employment and protectionist inefficiencies were the topic of recent reviews in the Wall Street Journal (Darlin (1986) ) and The Economist (1987) . Also, the Bank of Japan was recently quoted [Bank of International Settlement (1987) 1 as describing its economy in terms of duality, with relatively more rapid expansion expected in the service sector: "sluggish mining and industrial production, declining business activity in the manufacturing sector" contrasting with the fixed investment by non-manufacturers: "which have benefitted from the effects of the year's appreciation and low oil prices, are showing unexpected firmness, and they are limiting the deceleration of the economy asa whole... With the sustained increase in the non-manufacturing sector, the total number of employees will grow modestly."
CONCLUSION
The postwar rise of the U.S. economy's service sector continues trends in output and employment that reach back well over a century in U.S. history. The employment shift has much to do with slower productivity growth in services, the causes of which are not well understood. This evolution is not unique to the economy of the United States, but parallels changes in other industrial nations and, to some extent, developing economies as well.
The x-ising share of output and employment in the U.S. economy's services sector is even more pronounced when analyzed in terms of occupational categories. Moreover, the capital distribution in the United States also has been shifting toward service production. These are not symptoms of impending disaster for the U.S. economy. Rather, they are evidence of its efficient long-term evolution, propelled by the relatively more rapid growth of labor productivity in commodities than in services. Clearly, this evolution enhances the economy's capacity to provide rising standards of living for consumers and occupational satisfaction for workers.
